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Abstract 
The paper investigates institutional reforms in Vietnam and their impact on the economic 
performance of firms. Using the provincial competitiveness index 2006 (PCI06) and firm-
level data in Vietnam in 2005, the results show that provincial competitiveness is 
economically and statistically significant in explaining cross-province differences in firm 
performance. We find that a one percentage point improvement in government practice 
could increase the daily value-added of an average firm by an amount equivalent to nearly 
three times per capita GDP per day. The results show that an improvement in providing 
market information, more secure land tenure and labor training assistance has a positive 
effect on firm performance. By contrast, weaknesses in the judiciary system and 
administrative reforms impede growth of non-state firms. The findings indicate that 
governance is an important obstacle to the development of the non-state sector in Vietnam.  
JEL codes: B25, B52, D02, D23, N01, P26 
Key words: Institution, transition, property rights, non-state firm 
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1 Introduction 
Institutional economics (North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1991) emphasize the effects of 
institutions on economic growth through providing information, more secure property 
rights and stringent enforcement mechanisms to stimulate cooperation. Empirical 
investigations using cross-country-data have shown that better institutions are accompanied 
by higher economic performance (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et 
al., 2002). Studies that have used micro or national-level data to analyse the effects of 
institutions on economic performance are rather limited and most have focused on ex-
communist economies where property rights have recently been transferred from the state 
to individuals (Besley, 1995; Johnson et al., 2002b). 
The literature on the impact of institutions on economic performance within countries has 
focused on enforcement issues and the administrative quality of the public sector. 
Berkowitz and DeJong (2003), for example, find that businesses are more likely to establish 
themselves in regions that have more political support from the local government in Russia, 
while Laeven and Woodruff (2004) show that more effective jurisdictions are associated 
with larger firms in Mexico. A critical survey of both theoretical and empirical impacts of 
institutions on economic performance can be found in Gagliardi (2007). 
In this paper we investigate institutional reforms in Vietnam and the impact on firm 
economic performance using a provincial competitiveness index for 2006 (PCI06), and firm 
level data in Vietnam from 2005. A study of Vietnam is of particular interest because 
although it has a homogenous political system and government structure, and relatively 
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equal government expenditures in different parts of the country, economic performance is 
substantially different across provinces (VNCI-VCCI, 2005). Compared to other low-
income countries, Vietnam is also characterized by a high level of discretion by local 
government officials (Fforde and Vylder, 1996, p.260) 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 investigates institutional reforms and their 
implementation in different regions of Vietnam with a particular focus on the second phase 
of the Vietnamese reform process that began in 2000. An overview of the history and 
institutions in Vietnam is presented in Section 3 while the data and variables used in our 
analysis are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the econometric model and results of 
our investigations into institutional explanations for differences in economic performance 
across Vietnam. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.  
2 Vietnam: institutional reforms and implementation 
The economic reform process, called ‘Doi moi’ in Vietnam, has recognized the legal 
existence of the non-state sector since the beginning of the 1990s. Despite this legal 
landmark, the policy environment remained hostile to private businesses in the 1990s. 
Consequently, non-state firms faced many constraints to their establishment and growth.  
The Asian financial crisis in 1998 led to economic stagnation and thus contributed to the 
second phase of Vietnamese economic reforms. These stage two reforms have targeted the 
sustained growth of the non-state sector and were supported by the Enterprise Law of 1999. 
We investigate these institutional reforms and their implementation and impacts on firm 
performance through firm surveys. In this Section, we focus on three aspects of institutional 
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performance: (i) provision of information; (ii) security of private property rights; and (iii) 
lower transaction costs that arise from reduced administrative procedures and less 
discretion by state officials.  
2.1 Providing information 
Vietnam has been characterized by a lack of transparency and a service sector to support 
business development (IMF, 2000). For instance, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s report 
on Vietnam in 1997 observed that there were no business services (including information 
provision) in any of its listed labor categories.  
A survey on 153 firms in Vietnam in 1998 conducted by Service-Growth Consultants Inc 
(Canada) and Thien Ngan (Galaxy) Co.Ltd (Vietnam), with funding from Mekong Project 
Development Facility (MPDF) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), showed an 
increasing need for market information. One year later, in 1999, MPDF conducted a survey 
of 95 larger private manufacturers and found that a lack of market information was the 
second most important constraint to firm growth (Webster and Taussig, 1999, p. 30). 
Managers often complained about their inability to find information on inputs, outputs, 
alternative suppliers, buyers, price and price trend (Webster, 1999). Moreover, information 
about changes in policies and regulations as well as basic business registration such as firm 
name, address, and other details were not available to public and responsible officials 
(VNCI-CIEM, 2004). 
The business environment has improved with the issuance of the Enterprise Law (1999) 
that requires firms and business registration bodies to publicize information relating to 
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business registration. However, due to incompatibility among government bodies and the 
cost of publicizing information in newspapers, the requirement has not been fully 
implemented and varies across provinces. For example, Da Nang (a central province) and 
Ho Chi Minh City have a website with basic firm information. These cities also have 
established a commercial promotion centre to provide firms with market information. By 
contrast, the implementation of the Enterprise Law in other provinces is weak. For instance, 
in some provinces government agencies continue to complain about lack of information on 
firms and do not know the number of non-state firms under their supervision (GTZ-CIEM-
UNDP, 2004, p. 17). 
A lack of information persists as a major constraint to the development of non-state firms. 
A survey of 1200 private enterprises in 2001 carried out by the German Agency for 
Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the Swiss Foundation for Technical Cooperation 
(Swisscontact), in collaboration with InvestConsult Group, revealed a strong demand for 
information about a variety of business topics. A shortage of information about market and 
regulations is also prevalent (GTZ-Swisscontact, 2002). Another survey implemented in 
2001 on 414 private enterprises by MPDF indicated that accessing market information and 
penetrating markets are the biggest obstacles, followed by lack of capital (Nguyen et al., 
2002, p. 7).  
Acknowledging difficulties facing non-state firms, the Vietnamese Government issued 
Decree No.90/2001/CP-ND in support of the development of small and medium enterprises 
 6
(SMEs)1 and Decision No.94/2002/QD-TTG to reform the mechanisms and policies to 
stimulate the development of the non-state sector. These decisions led to the formation of 
the Agency for SME Development (ASMED) in October 2002 that has as one of its key 
roles to provide a countrywide firm information system on technology, management, 
markets, promotion and government regulations related to firm operation. To date, ASMED 
has worked well in undertaking business registration and regulations. Its provision of 
market information, however, remains weak and implementation varies across provinces, 
depending on the attitude of local government officials towards the non-state sector 
(Malesky, 2004).  
To overcome the shortage of information and promote cooperation among firms, firms have 
established their own business associations. In 2002, there were around 200 business 
associations operating throughout the country (Nguyen et al., 2002, p. vii) and the 2001 
survey of MPDF shows that business associations perform well in providing information on 
policies and legal issues to members. Unfortunately, only a few large and well-known 
business associations provide, at a modest level, market information. For instance, the 
Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) is equipped with an internet-based 
information system for SMEs, which is transferred from GTZ (www.smenet.com.vn), and 
has set up a centre to promote cooperation among firms. 
                                                 
1 SMEs in Vietnam are defined as having up to 300 workers. 
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Business development services (BDS) have also been encouraged by the provincial and 
central governments. However, a survey on 746 firms conducted in 2002 by CSEG2 and 
CIEM3 shows that firms often complain about the quality of information that they have 
bought. Consequently, many firms obtain their information informally through friends and 
relatives (Figure 1). Firms in the survey also consider that a lack of information on markets 
and customers weakens their competitiveness. They, in particular, demand information on 
markets such as identity of local buyers, overseas clients, potential partners and price 
(CSEG and CIEM, 2002). 
[Figure 1 is about here] 
A recent survey conducted by the World Bank in 2004 of 42 enterprises that are contractors 
and subcontractors reveals that lack of information is the most limiting constraint 
preventing cooperation. Searching for information about contractors and subcontractors is 
time-consuming. Consequently, firms, especially SMEs, have to rely on personal sources to 
advertise their products. Similarly, contractors find it hard to identify an appropriate 
supplier due to lack of basic data or items such as catalogues or brochures that also limit 
cooperation (Carlier and Tran, 2005).  
In summary, institutional reforms since 2000 have improved the provision of information 
relating to regulations. However, weaknesses remain in providing market information and 
                                                 
2 Crawford School of Economics and Government (CSEG) – the Australian National University 
3 Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM) – The Ministry of Planning and Investment of Vietnam 
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the implementation of the central government’s regulations and policies varies across 
provinces.  
2.2 More secure property rights 
In 2000, the IMF observed that Vietnam did not have secure private property rights. Six 
years later, the Heritage Foundation 2007 (Kane et al., 2007) gave a score of just 10% to 
Vietnam in terms of security of its property rights, whereas other measures of institutional 
performance are rated above 50%. ‘Hot’ problems that are related to private property rights, 
and often cited as impeding the private sector performance in Vietnam, are land, contract 
enforcement and dispute resolution.  
2.2.1 Land  
According to the Constitution of Vietnam, land belongs to the state. The Land Law 1993, 
however, recognizes the right to use allocated land parcels. This law also allows holders to 
transfer and mortgage the land use right (LUR) for a specific period (Section 2 - The Land 
Law 1993). However, because this law does not define clearly the functions of related 
government bodies, the implementation of giving land use right certificates (LURC) is very 
weak. As a result, many non-state firms have their own premises but do not have an LURC 
as collateral for loans. [For instance, according to the firm survey in 2002 by CSEG and 
CIEM, among non-state firms having their own premises, only 51.7% hold LURC]. This 
limits the potential of firms to borrow and to grow their businesses (e.g. Ronnas and 
Ramamurthy, 2001; Carlier and Tran, 2004a).  
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A consequence of the planned economy and the Vietnam Constitution is that all utilized 
land is allocated to individuals and SOEs, and the procedure to apply for land for business 
purposes is both complicated and costly. Firms incur substantial transaction costs by 
visiting many government agencies, paying a large amount in terms of informal fees and 
waiting for around 2-3 years for the final decision (Carlier and Tran, 2004b). Due to a lack 
of premises, non-state firms have also to rent un-utilized land from state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) unofficially or from individuals, weakening their competitiveness as the market rent 
is high compared to the official price stipulated by the government. In addition, the contract 
term is often of short duration because landlords want to raise rents after short periods to 
ensure ‘catch up’ with a rising land price. As a result, non-state firms avoid investing in 
long term assets on their rental premises (Carlier and Tran, 2004b). The net result is an 
increase in both transaction and transformation costs.  
To increase the land supply for non-state firms, the government issued the Land Law 
Amendment 1998 and the Domestic Investment Promotion Amendment 1998. These 
promote the construction of industrial zones and require provinces to publish information 
on available land. However, constructing industrial zones takes time because it requires 
compensation be paid for confiscated land. Moreover, there is no government body in 
charge of confiscated non-used land and the publication of information on available land 
depends on local governments (Malesky, 2004).  
The new Land Law 2003 may be a turning point for issues associated with land tenure. As 
stipulated by this law, a subordinate system of Land Use Right Registration agencies is 
established to take charge of LURC. This creates a ‘one stop shop’, saving much money 
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and time for LURC applicants. Further, to increase land supply for the non-state sector, an 
agency called the Land Fund Development Organization was created. Its function is to 
confiscate non-used land previously allocated to SOEs and other organizations.  Another 
break-through of the new Land Law 2003 is that it tries to create a clear distinction between 
formal and informal land prices.4 However, the implementation of this law, as in the case 
of providing market and other information, depends on practices of local government 
authorities (Carlier and Tran, 2004b). 
2.2.2 Contract enforcement and dispute resolution  
The Vietnamese government has carried out many institutional reforms to stimulate the 
development of the non-state sector, but reforms of the judiciary system have been often 
neglected. To date, the sole improvement in this area is the anti-corruption ‘voice’ of the 
media towards the judiciary system. When weak contract enforcement has existed as part of 
‘business culture’ (Doan, 1999), the use of the courts to solve disputes is very low. For 
example, in a survey of 259 managers of non-state firms in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City in 
1995-975, only 9% said that a court or other government agencies could help to solve their 
                                                 
4 The formal price of land is the price that the state pays for confiscated land. This is much lower than the 
market (informal) price, generating a huge benefit for those who get LUR from the state and thus induces 
corruption in this area. 
5 The survey was conducted with support of the Vietnam-Pacific Program and the Academic Senate of the 
University of California, San Diego. 
 11
disputes (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). Although the incidence is much higher in the 
south than the north of Vietnam (Malesky, 2004), this proportion is much lower than in 
other transition economies (Johnson et al., 2002a).  
Weaknesses in the judiciary system and an attitude that litigation may lead to a negative 
reputation encourages firms to rely on business associations to solve their disputes. 
Calculations based on the data set of the CSEG and CIEM firm survey in 2002 shows that 
only 7% of firms in the sample had disputes during the period of 5 years. Once disputes 
arise, however, business associations are the most common method of resolution. The 
reasons for not using courts include fears about the complications of lawsuits, the 
possibility of an unfair judge and possible damage of reputation with business partners.  
A low level of business disputes is not necessarily a positive indication of economic 
development. Rather, it may reflect too much prudence in selecting partners. The survey on 
non-state SMEs of the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) in 1996 
and 2001 reveals that cooperation is mostly between non-state SMEs and other domestic 
private enterprises in the same district/town. Relationships outside of the regions and with 
SOEs are few, and there is little cooperation with foreign companies (Table 1). Moreover, 
to get partners to enforce contract agreements, contractors (large firms) often delay their 
payment until the next delivery. This accumulates financial difficulties for smaller firms 
(subcontractors) (Carlier and Tran, 2005).  
[Table 1 is about here] 
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2.3 Reducing administrative procedures and official arbitrariness  
A significant change in business costs has arisen from the issuance of the Enterprise Law 
1999 in that many barriers preventing the establishment of firms have been reduced. 
Consequently, the time it takes to establish an enterprise has been reduced from 90 to 7 
days, on average. The registration fee has also decreased from VND 10 million to VND 
500 thousand. Also importantly, the ‘bureaucratic attitude’ has diminished thanks to a 
clearer definition of the functions of each government body (GTZ-CIEM-UNDP, 2004). 
The Land Law 2003 has also reduced administrative costs in obtaining LURC. Business 
operations, thus, have become more flexible and secure. 
In other areas such as tax reform, unfortunately, red tape and low transparency still remain 
as major obstacles to the establishment and growth of private firms. In a survey of 300 
firms carried out by the MPDF and World Bank in Vietnam in 2002/03, firms often 
complain about the discretion and bureaucratic attitude of tax officers. The fact that firms 
have to pay unofficial fees is common because tax officers usually hide information, 
making the regulation environment unclear (Carlier and Tran 2004a). 
Other problems also exist. For instance, legal documents in Vietnam require all transactions 
to be proved by a ‘red invoice’6 that can be bought only at tax offices. Whenever firms 
come to buy, tax officers sell only one book (containing 50 invoices). This means firms 
                                                 
6 This is the official invoice published by the Ministry of Finance. The name comes from its colour. 
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have to come back in two weeks or a month to get more. For some firms, visiting a tax 
office is costly. According to a recent survey conducted by CIEM on 360 firms in 2007, on 
average, a firm has to spend 2,000 hours or 245 days per year, which is equivalent to hire 
one staff member to take charge of all tax procedures, while completing the tax regulations 
only requires about 30 days (http://www.dautuchungkhoan.com/Nganhang-
Taichinh/2007/08/23938.OTC). The issuance of the Tax Law in 2006, which was enforced 
in July 2007, will help as firms are allowed to calculate and pay taxes online. This is a 
major administrative reform and creates a ‘one-stop shop’ in terms of business taxation. 
3 Institutional implementation: reasons for differences and measurement 
The political system and government structures in Vietnam are identical everywhere but the 
implementation of the central government’s laws and regulations varies across regions. In 
particular, differences are more pronounced between the north and south of the country. 
History, geography and the complexity of laws and regulations are key factors explaining 
institutional variation. 
History and geography 
Vietnamese culture originated in the north and in the Red River Delta (RRD) in particular. 
Early in its history, the RRD was characterized by a high population density with almost all 
in rural areas with poor infrastructure that limited communications between districts and 
provinces (Gourou, 1936). 
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In terms of economic structure, the Vietnamese culture was historically characterized by 
wet rice cultivation and village settlements. The village was an autonomous community 
which collected taxes from its citizens and fulfilled its obligations to the state. Tax 
obligations of a village were levied on the number of its citizens. Because there was no 
official birth and death registration system, coupled with the difficult communication, 
chiefs of villages had incentives to hide the number of new births from the government to 
keep a proportion of collected taxes for their own benefit. The independence of villages 
was manifested by the sayings ‘phép vua thua lệ làng’ – translated as ‘the laws of the King 
yield to the customs of the village’ that is still true until today. 
The population of the RRD generated little surplus production. Commercial markets were 
very small. Citizens produced most of their need from food to housing materials, and were 
inclined toward saving (Gourou, 1936). In summary, a high level of independence of local 
governments, lack of transparency between local and central governments, and self-
sufficiency are the heritage of the north. 
The south, with its core area of the Mekong River Delta (MRD), has been settled by people 
from the north and centre of Vietnam since the 17th century. The first migrants to the south 
from the north and centre were those who had lost, or could not find, a place in the villages 
(Thach Phuong et al., 1992). Difficulties for the first migrants stimulated a cooperative and 
audacious attitude among these frontiermen (Son Nam, 2000). 
The contrast between the RRD and MRD is documented by  Rambo (1973), Taylor (1983), 
Jamieson (1993) and Brocheux (1995). As described in these studies, village organizations 
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in the south were much less rigid when compared to the closed political center of villages in 
the north. Moreover, less diversity in the environment reduced differences in locally 
adapted agricultural production and the need for systems as in the north. Contrary to the 
‘closed community’ in the north, southern people have also been characterized as being 
open and less accepting of northern traditional norms. They consume more and this 
substantial consumption difference between the RRD and MRD remains true today, as 
shown in Table 2. 
[Table 2 is about here] 
More predictable and benign weather in the MRD, coupled with a convenient water 
transportation system, promoted faster economic development in the south. The south also 
experienced a greater western influence because the French exercised direct control in the 
south first and later developed French rule and administered indirectly the north, through 
local Vietnamese administrators (Jamieson, 1993, p. 5). Moreover, twenty-five years of 
exposure to the world market economy until 1975 has made southern Vietnamese more 
market-minded. 
The complexity of laws 
In Vietnam, due to the complexity of law, to guide the implementation of laws, a large 
number of sublaws such as decrees, decisions and regulations are issued. This, in turn, 
makes the regulatory environment more complicated, and the implementation of laws 
depends very much on the interpretation of local officials (Gillespie, 1993; Le et al., 1999; 
Webster, 1999; GTZ-CIEM-UNDP, 2004; Nguyen et al., 2004). Even when regulations are 
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clear, there are always opportunities for local authorities to apply their own interpretation to 
central policies (Tenev et al., 2003). 
Institution implementation measurement 
History, differences in culture and geography, and the complexity of laws, have led to a 
high level of discretion by local authorities in the implementation of rules and decrees in 
Vietnam. This is particularly true in the implementation of the central government’s 
regulations and policies towards the non-state sector. An indicator, which measures the 
attitude and the implementation of laws and central government regulations and policies at 
a provincial level, is the provincial competitiveness index (PCI). The first PCI was 
calculated in 2005 (PCI05) for 42 provinces, based on a firm survey and also on interviews 
with state officials in 2004. The PCI05 is a weighted index of 9 sub-indices: business entry 
costs; access to land; transparency and access to information; time costs of regulatory 
compliance; informal charges; implementation and consistency of policies; state sector 
bias; pro-activity of provincial leadership; and private sector development policies. While 
each sub-index is scored from 1 to 10, the PCI is marked from 1 to 100 with a higher score 
indicating better institutional performance. 
Following the success of the PCI05, the Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative (VNCI) - a 
USAID (the United States Agency for International Development) funded project, and the 
Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) repeated its study in 2006 based on 
the firm survey in 2005. Both PCI05 and PCI06 reflect the improvement of institutions at a 
provincial level since the issuance of the Enterprise Law in 1999. Nevertheless, the results 
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from the PCI06 are considered more reliable for several reasons. First, all 64 provinces of 
the country participated in 2005, thus increasing the number of surveyed firms three-fold 
(6379 businesses versus 2020 firms in 2004). Second, two new sub-indices, ‘labor training’ 
and ‘legal institutions’, were introduced (VNCI-VCCI, 2006). The ‘labor training’ index 
assesses provincial assistance with skilled labor shortage while the ‘legal institutions’ index 
reflects the generalized trust of private businesses in the judiciary system to resolve 
disputes. Third, the methodology to calculate sub-indices, assigned weight, and the 
aggregate PCI was improved (VNCI-VCCI, 2006, p. 1). 
Overall, the PCI reflects the arbitrariness, red tape and corruption of local government 
officials in the way they implement legal documents and policies from the central 
government. As the PCI06 is more reliable in terms of statistics, most of the estimations in 
this paper use the PCI06 and its sub-indices. 
4 Data and variables 
To analyze the impact of institutional changes on firm performance since the second phase 
of reform in 2000, we combine the use of the PCI06 described above and countrywide firm 
level data by province in 2005. The survey is conducted by the General Statistics Office 
(GSO) of Vietnam. Although this is the country-wide enterprise survey, information on 
costs is limited to the sample. As the paper focuses on the effect of institutions on non-state 
enterprise performance, only the sub-sample of non-state manufacturing firms is used. In 
addition, the exclusion of missing and irrelevant values, including negative value-added 
(VA), visible outliers, large firms that employ more than 2,000 workers, and provinces with 
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a small numbers of enterprises, reduces the sample to 1,727 observations. Summary 
statistics from the firm characteristics of survey data are presented in Table 3. 
[Table 3 is about here] 
Currently, the non-state sector in Vietnam includes household firms, cooperative 
enterprises, sole proprietorships, partnership enterprises, and limited and shareholding 
companies. However, the survey conducted by the GSO only collects information on 
formally registered firms. Thus, household enterprises are not included in the survey and 
because there are only four partnership enterprises included in the sample, we also exclude 
them from the analysis. 
Column 1, Table 3 shows that the majority of non-state enterprises in the sample are limited 
companies, followed by sole proprietorship firms. Firms at a small and medium size, using 
from 10 to 300 workers, dominate this sample. Most of the firms in the sample were 
established at the time the reforms took place in 2000 (column 2). Other indicators 
including firm size, fixed asset and VA show that large firms and advanced structures, 
including limited and shareholding companies, have higher VA and fixed assets. 
We model the effects of institutional differences by province on firm labor productivity. To 
control for differences in firm specific characteristics, dummy variables for firm size, 
including micro, small, medium and large groups7, firm age, capital intensity (as measured 
                                                 
7 By definition, micro firms employ less than 10 workers while large firms have 300 workers and above.  
 19
as fixed assets per worker) and ownership types are included. The economic environment 
that affects firm performance, such as the initial endowments of provinces including human 
capital and market size, is included in the model as a control. Human capital is measured by 
the percentage of graduates in the total population of each province using the 1999 
population census data. Another way of measuring human capital is the proportion of 
students enrolled in professional high school education as a proportion of the provincial 
total population in 2001. This variable reflects, to some extent, local needs for skilled 
workers. This information is extracted from the standard statistical book for 64 provinces of 
Vietnam (GSO, 2005). Market size is measured by the proportion of population of each 
province over the total population and per capita GDP. Per capita GDP is calculated as the 
average value for the period 2001-04 [market size is included as a control because a large 
market can support mass production and advanced technologies (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; 
Murphy et al., 1989) that can increase labor productivity (LP)]. Appendix A provides more 
detail on variables used in the estimated models. 
5 Econometric model and results 
The model we estimate to analyse the impacts of institutions on firm performance in 
Vietnam is given by equation (1). 
0ij i J ijlog( )lp X Zβ β δ γ ε= + + + Γ +
lp
  (1) 
where:  is labor productivity of firm i at province j ij
 0β  is firm specific effect 
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  is a vector of firm specific characteristics iX
Z
Γ
  is a vector of the provincial initial endowment j
  is a vector of institution variables 
 ijε  is the error term 
As often cited in the literature, differences in history and culture are the reasons for 
differences in economic performance between the north and south of Vietnam. Kim (2006) 
finds evidence of differences in property rights between the north and south and attributes it 
to differentials in social norms and politics. To test the hypothesis that differences in 
history and culture affect firm performance, a North dummy variable is used as a proxy for 
institutions in model (1).  Controlling for differences in firm characteristics, human capital 
and market size, we find the evidence that, overall, firms located in the south perform better 
than those in the north (specification 1, column 1 and 2, Table 4). 
[Table 4 is about here] 
The argument that the south used to be a market economy and thus has more experience 
under the liberalized era than the northern bureaucracy rooted economy seems reasonable. 
However, Nguyen et al. (2004) argue that history is not an important indicator as the reform 
process began some 15 years ago. During that period the north approached western 
economies faster than the south as more scholarships to study in western countries were 
allocated to the north and returned scholars might bring western working styles to the north. 
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They also make a comparison of economic performance among some provinces in the 
south with some in the north and conclude that differences in economic performance arise 
from differences in the implementation of legal regulations and policies rather than history. 
We argue that history still matters and differences in history and culture define the way 
institutions are implemented. Our evidence is that when PCI06 is added into specification 
1, it is insignificant and the power of North becomes smaller (column 4, Table 4). This is 
because PCI06 is highly correlated with the north-south dummy (Table 5) and it is likely 
that the dominant impact of social norms influences the power of the institutional variable. 
[Table 5 is about here] 
The relationship between the total PCI06 and its sub-indices with regions are also examined 
in Figure 2 where each plotted dot reflects the province rank in implementing the central 
government institutions and policies. The vertical line divides provinces into northern and 
southern regions where northern provinces are located on the left of the line. The horizontal 
line goes through the middle performing points and splits plotted points into lower and 
higher governance performers (below and above the line, respectively). Overall, southern 
provinces are often found in the northeast corner of each figure, indicating that southern 
provinces implement the central government regulations and policies better than those in 
the north. It is also seen that the judiciary system is the worst performing area as the 
majority of provinces are located under the horizontal line (Figure 2e). 
[Figure 2 is about here] 
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To investigate the impact of institutional implementation on firm performance, we include 
PCI06 into model (1) and exclude North to reduce multicollinearity. The effects of sub-
indices are also investigated by additional specifications presented in Table 6. For instance, 
the effects of information provision on firm performance are examined in specifications 4 
and 5 (Table 6). ‘Information’ in specification 4 presents the level of access to the central 
government regulations and policies at the province level, while specification 5 reflects the 
availability of market information. Differences in property rights can be evaluated through 
an ‘access to land’ index (specification 6) and disputes (specification 7). Disputes are 
measured by the ‘legal institutions’ index, which indicates the confidence of the private 
sector in the judiciary system to resolve their disputes. The possible impact of a lowering of 
transaction costs through simplifying administrative procedures and reducing state officers’ 
arbitrariness on firm performance is analyzed in specification 8. This specification of 
institutional performance is constructed from ‘entry cost’ and ‘time costs of regulatory 
compliance’ indices, respecting their weight in the PCI06. ‘Labor training’ presented in 
specification 9 does not reflect institutional reforms, rather it reflects the supporting attitude 
of local government to promoting the development of the non-state sector. This index is 
included in the analysis because unskilled workers and managers may impede growth of 
non-state enterprises and thus government assistance in this area could be important (see 
Appendix A for the description of indices used in the estimated models). 
To check the robustness of variables included into various specifications, we apply a 
general-to-specific modeling approach in Hendry and Krolzig (2001). Once a general 
unrestricted model (GUM) is formulated, the algorithm of the method checks outliers, 
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defined by its number of lσ GUM unit. Impacts of these outliers on the dependant variable are 
neutralized by creating dummy variables for each outlier. In a second stage, a multiple 
search path using Monte Carlo simulation is used to evaluate relevant variables to be 
retained in the simplified model. Principally, the multiple search path removes insignificant 
variables from the GUM. After obtaining a specific model, the significance of parameters 
in the final selected model is evaluated in two over-lapping sub-samples (Owen, 2003). 
Reliability statistics are reported. A higher reliability value indicates higher level of 
statistical significance of the selected variable in both the full sample and sub-samples. 
These results are presented in Table 6. 
[Table 6 is about here] 
As shown in Table 6, there is no heteroskedasticity in all models studied and the Chow tests 
at mid-point and 90th percentile breakpoints confirm the constancy of parameters. The 
results indicate that firm age has a positive effect on labor productivity. One more year of 
operation makes firms more efficient presumably due to the accumulation of skills and 
experience, reflecting the ‘learning by doing’ process. Among different firm sizes, large 
groups are excluded from the model as a reference group. The Monte Carlo study retains 
only micro groups in the specific models. Small and medium groups do not satisfy the 
statistical significance of the ‘pre-search’ tests and thus, are excluded from the models. This 
implies that statistical differences in firm performance are only found between micro and 
large groups. Cooperatives perform less efficiently than sole-proprietorships (excluded 
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from the model as a base) because they have disadvantages in terms of capital and 
flexibility in making decisions.8 Limited and shareholding companies are modern 
establishments with advanced technology and management skills, hence performing better 
than sole-proprietorships. 
The proportion of graduates over total population in 1999 has the expected positive sign, at 
least in some cases (column 1 and 10, Table 6). The percentage of professional high school 
students (edus01) has an insignificant impact on firm performance and is excluded from the 
models by the general to specific modeling procedure. This may be because the number of 
students is not a good indicator for human capital of provinces as a proportion of students 
come from other provinces to study and later return to their place of origin. Per capita GDP 
also has the expected positive sign and the reliability of being included into the model of 
this variable is 100%. 
Institutional effects  
The parameter of interest in equation (1), γ , estimated by PcGets - software which is used 
to implement the general to specific modeling approach - reveals an interesting aspect of 
the institutional reforms in Vietnam. As expected, the overall institutional index PCI06 has 
a positive effect on firm performance (specification 3, column 1, Table 6). The result shows 
that after controlling for differences in firm characteristics and provincial initial 
                                                 
8 Under the Law on Cooperatives, all members of a cooperative enterprise have an equal vote in every 
business. This limits the flexibility in decision making of firms.  
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endowments, a one percentage point improvement in government practices increases firm 
LP by 0.7%. This is equivalent to an increase in the value-added of the sample mean firm 
by VND 77,496.5 per day that corresponds to a nearly three-fold increase in the 
Vietnamese daily per capita GDP (VND 28,050.12) in 2005.9
Information provision in specification 4 (column 4, Table 6) reflects the impacts of the 
transparency in government policies and regulations on firm performance. Compared to the 
period before the enterprise law (1999), the availability of regulatory information has much 
improved with most provinces rated above the average level (Figure 2b). However, 
improvements in this area merely reduce troubles facing non-state firms in terms of 
acknowledging the macro-economic environment, and thus can not promote firm 
performance. In fact, firms need market information to expand their businesses. Although 
the improvement in providing market information has been moderate, it has a positive 
effect on firm economic performance as reflected in specification 5 (column 7, Table 6). 
Provinces with a one percentage point higher in providing firms with market information 
can increase firm LP by 5.3%. This is much higher than the increase of LP due to the 
improvement in the total PCI. The result confirms that market information is important to 
growth of non-state firms in Vietnam. 
                                                 
9 The sample mean firm employs 131.35 workers and has a ln =3.427. An increase by 0.7% of labor 
productivity is equivalent to an increase of VND 590 per day. On average, this increases the VA of the sample 
mean firm by VND 77,546.5, nearly three times per capita GDP per day (VND 28,050.12). 
( )lp
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Institutional reforms related to land issues have positive impacts on firm performance. 
Results from specification 6 (column 10, Table 6) show a big improvement in firm 
performance if the governance level is better. For instance, if Hanoi - the region with the 
highest human capital with per capita GDP almost twice that of Soc Trang (a poor province 
in the south) - could improve its implementation of land reforms by 3.79 points to catch up 
Soc Trang, an average firm in Hanoi can increase its LP by 38.66%. This is equivalent to an 
increase of VA of an average firm in Hanoi by VND 37,603, or 1.34 times of the daily per 
capita GDP in 2005. The result is, perhaps, a good answer for the puzzle posed in Nguyen 
et al. (2004) ‘why southern provinces grow much faster than those in the north’. However, 
it should be noted that the statistical reliability of ‘land’ reported by PcGets is only 22.3%. 
That means this variable is significant in the full sample, but not in both sub-samples in the 
overlapping analysis. 
Other aspects of institutional reforms including ‘dispute’ and ‘transaction cost’ have 
insignificant effects on firm performance (specification 7 and 8), and hence are eliminated 
from the model by the multiple search path of PcGets. The insignificant effect of ‘dispute’ 
can be explained by no reform in this area. On the other hand, ‘transaction cost’ measures 
the aggregate effect of diminishing time for firm entry, land acquisition and bureaucratic 
compliance. Albeit that entry cost has decreased significantly since the second phase 
reform, this is still more costly than in other countries (Youth Newspaper10 12th Oct 2006) 
                                                 
10 Translated from Vietnamese ‘Báo Thanh Niên’ ngày 12/10/2006. 
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and helps firms in the establishment stage only. Furthermore, red tape and discretion of 
state officials remain in many areas, causing difficulties for the operation of firms. 
Government assistance in labor training has a positive impact on firm LP (column 19, 
Table 6). This positive effect indicates that central and local governments have prescribed a 
correct policy for a persistent problem of unskilled workers in non-state firms. The findings 
imply that although all governance areas need to be improved, a good reform strategy 
would be to focus on good governance services, labor training and effective dispute 
resolution. 
To assess the economic significance of the effects of PCI06, we calculate the average of 
firm observed LP for each province and graph the mean observed LP on PCI06. We also 
carry out a simple simulation based on specification 3 in Table 6. As all coefficients in this 
specific model are significantly different from zero, no variable is excluded from the 
simulation. The predicted l  is then transformed into levels. The mean of firm 
predicted LP is computed for each province and graphed on PCI06 as well. If the ranking 
of the mean of the observed and predicted LP on the PCI06 is different, the estimated 
coefficients are only statistically significant, not economically significant. Figure 3 presents 
the rankings of the mean observed and predicted LP of firms in each province. 
og( )lp
[Figure 3 is about here] 
As shown in Figure 3, the pattern of the mean observed and predicted LP is not different. 
Overall, the average firm in provinces with higher PCI06 has higher LP. We also categorize 
the predicted LP of the average firm for each province into quartiles in ascending order of 
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PCI06. The average of predicted LP of the lowest and highest quartile groups is computed. 
The ratio of these means is 1.18, indicating that PCI06 is both economically and 
statistically significant in explaining differences in firm performance. The findings imply 
that in the short term, provinces can promote the sustainable development of the non-state 
sector by more effective implementation of central government reforms. 
6 Conclusion 
The transition period in Vietnam has witnessed much effort by the Vietnamese government 
in building institutions supporting markets. These institutional reforms, especially since the 
second phase in 2000, focus on the sustainable development of the non-state sector. The 
reforms have significantly improved the provision of regulatory information and, to some 
extent, market information. Land tenure and entry costs have been also improved. 
However, weaknesses remain in the judiciary system and administration reforms to reduce 
government officials’ discretion. 
The prominent feature of the institutional reforms in Vietnam is the differences in the 
implementation of the central government’s regulations and policies in different regions of 
the country. These differences are more pronounced between the north and the south and 
the causes for this institutional variation are history, geography and the complexity of laws 
in Vietnam. 
To examine the impact of institutional reforms on firm economic performance, we use firm 
level data in Vietnam in 2005 and the provincial competitiveness index in 2006 (PCI06). 
The results indicate that good governance practices, reflected by PCI06, are both 
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statistically and economically significant in explaining differences in firm economic 
performance among provinces. Based on the estimated model, we show that a one 
percentage point improvement in government practices could increase the value-added of 
the sample mean firm by an amount equal to a nearly three-times increase in the 
Vietnamese daily per capita GDP. 
The results indicate that an improvement of institutions in providing firms with market 
information, securing land tenure and labor training assistance, positively increases firm 
labor productivity. The implications are that central and local governments prescribe 
correct policies for non-state firms’ persistent problems, including lack of market 
information, and land and skilled worker shortages. The insignificant impact of transaction 
costs and dispute resolution implies that attention should be paid to administrative reforms 
to reduce government officials’ discretion and also the weakness of the judiciary system. 
Overall, the results show that governance is an important obstacle to the development of the 
non-state business sector and that institutions matter in terms of private firm economic 
performance in Vietnam. 
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Appendix A: List of variables 
Variables Explanation Source Level 
Log(lp) Log of labor productivity GSO firm survey in 2005 Firm 
K*L ratio Capital/labor ratio GSO firm survey in 2005 Firm 
Firm age Number of years of operation GSO firm survey in 2005 Firm 
Micro Dummy variable for micro firm GSO firm survey in 2005 Firm 
Small Dummy variable for small firm GSO firm survey in 2005 Firm 
Medium Dummy variable for medium firm GSO firm survey in 2005 Firm 
Large Dummy variable for large firm – 
excluded from the model as a 
reference group 
GSO firm survey in 2005 Firm 
Cooperative Dummy variable for cooperative 
firm 
GSO firm survey in 2005 Firm 
Private Dummy variable for private firm – 
excluded from the model as a base 
GSO firm survey in 2005 Firm 
Limited Dummy variable for limited 
companies 
GSO firm survey in 2005 Firm 
Shareholding Dummy variable for shareholding 
companies 
GSO firm survey in 2005 Firm 
Edus01 Proportion of students enrolled in 
professional high school education 
as a proportion of the provincial 
total population in 2001 
GSO, (2005) ‘Socio-
economic statistical data of 
64 provinces and cities’ 
book 
Province 
Edu99 Percentage of graduates in the total 
population of each province 
GSO, population census in 
1999 
Province 
GDPP Average per capita GDP during 
2001-04 
GSO website (GDP and 
population) 
Province 
% of population Proportion of population of each 
province over the total population 
GSO website (population) Province 
North Regional dummy variable   
PCI06 Provincial competitiveness index, 
2006 
VNCI&VCCI, 2006 Province 
Information 1 ‘Transparency and access to 
information’ index 
VNCI&VCCI, 2006 Province 
Information 2 ‘Private sector development 
services’ index 
VNCI&VCCI, 2006 Province 
Land ‘Land access and security of tenure 
index’ 
VNCI&VCCI, 2006 Province 
Dispute ‘Legal institutions’ index VNCI&VCCI, 2006 Province 
Transaction cost Weighted index of ‘entry costs’ and 
‘time costs of regulatory 
compliance’ indices 
VNCI&VCCI, 2006 Province 
Labor training ‘Labor training index’ VNCI&VCCI, 2006 Province 
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Figure 3 Rankings of observed and predicted mean LP on PCI06 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data set of CSEG & CIEM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Proportion of sample firms using each kind of business service 
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Figure 2 Plots of institution indicators across provinces 
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Tables 
Table 1 Distribution of contractors 
 1996 (%) 2001(%)
Non-state enterprise in same district/town       65.12      43.02 
Non-state enterprise outside district/town       11.63      25.58 
State enterprise in same district/town        8.14      13.95 
State enterprise outside district/town        6.98      11.63 
Foreign company        4.65        1.16 
Other        3.49        4.65 
Total 100.00 100.00
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data set of MOLISA on SMEs 
Table 2 Consumption per capita 1995-2005 
VND† million/person 
Year Whole 
nation 
RRD North 
East 
North 
West 
North 
Central 
Coast 
South 
Central 
Coast 
Central 
Highlands 
South 
East 
MRD
1995 1.66 1.37 0.72 0.63 0.87 1.70 0.67 4.22 1.54 
1996 1.97 1.66 0.99 0.77 1.02 1.95 1.02 4.90 1.75 
1997 2.15 1.76 1.08 0.71 1.14 2.20 1.16 5.22 2.00 
1998 2.43 1.98 1.23 0.82 1.24 2.44 1.34 5.99 2.22 
1999 2.59 2.17 1.19 0.85 1.32 2.62 1.58 6.25 2.39 
2000 2.84 2.53 1.27 0.90 1.47 2.59 1.79 6.70 2.66 
2001 3.12 2.74 1.72 1.01 1.59 3.07 1.85 7.14 2.86 
2002 3.52 3.21 1.95 1.18 1.73 3.24 2.10 8.04 3.23 
2003 4.13 3.75 2.25 1.24 1.97 3.96 2.31 9.44 3.79 
2004 4.86 4.44 2.74 1.54 2.35 4.54 2.77 10.95 4.47 
2005 5.78 5.31 3.18 2.01 2.75 5.31 3.38 12.94 5.36 
Source: GSO (www.gso.gov.vn) 
Note: † The currency of Vietnam. 
Based on differences in geography, history and culture, and politics, Vietnam is divided 
into 8 ecological regions: RRD includes 11 provinces in the Red River area; North East 
contains 11 highland and mountainous provinces north east of Hanoi; North West includes 
4 mountainous provinces north west of Hanoi. North Central Coast includes 6 north coast 
provinces while South Central Coast includes 6 south coast provinces. Central Highlands 
contains 4 highland provinces in the central south. The South East includes Ho Chi Minh 
City and other developed provinces in the south, while the MRD contains 12 provinces. 
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Table 3 Firm characteristics by ownership type and firm size 
 Firm 
ownership 
& size 
distribution 
(%) 
% of firms 
established 
since 2000 
Avg firm 
age (# 
years) 
Avg firm 
size (# 
workers) 
Avg fixed 
asset  
(VND 
billion)  
Avg value-
added (VND 
billion) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total 100.00 
 
64.97 7.02 
(6.84) 
131.39 
(229.37) 
7054.76 
(17599.19) 
8060.82 
(19816.66) 
Firm ownership 
• Cooperative 4.52 28.21 14.38 
(13.24) 
81.55 
(153.24) 
1661.33 
(5611.86) 
3400.04 
(11581.84) 
• Sole 
proprietorship 
25.07 63.74 6.60 
(4.09) 
50.95 
(107.89) 
1846.67 
(4256.89) 
2963.97 
(10299.78) 
• Limited 55.18 69.25 5.67 
(3.33) 
142.54 
(244.29) 
7889.18 
(18975.54) 
7926.12 
(18305.15) 
• Shareholding 15.23 62.36 10.45 
(12.39) 
237.89 
(283.48) 
14205.28 
(24199.47) 
18322.59 
(31622.33) 
Firm size 
• Micro 11.52 71.36 5.71 
(4.29) 
6.01 
(2.09) 
459.06 
(557.45) 
547.70 
(2755.08) 
• Small 42.04 71.07 6.15 
(5.73) 
24.25 
(10.91) 
1656.19 
(3496.93) 
2468.61 
(9109.58) 
• Medium 34.11 60.61 7.77 
(7.71) 
128.72 
(70.20) 
7987.35 
(13270.39) 
9631.12 
(19195.41) 
• Large 12.33 50.23 9.16 
(8.72) 
620.44 
(346.29) 
29038.84 
(36912.01) 
29798.58 
(35251.00) 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the countrywide firm survey 2004 (GSO) 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
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Table 4 Impact of history and culture on firm performance 
Dependent variable: log(lp) 
 1: North only  2: North & PCI06 
 Coeff t-values Coeff t-values
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 2.822 21.68 2.836 9.70
K*L ratio 0.002 10.8 0.002 10.8
Firm age 0.009 1.97 0.009 1.97
Micro  -0.114 -0.91 -0.114 -0.91
Small 0.090 0.91 0.089 0.91
Medium 0.135 1.40 0.135 1.40
Cooperative -0.445 -2.92 -0.444 -2.91
Limited 0.163 2.11 0.164 2.09
Shareholding 0.486 4.62 0.486 4.62
Edus01 0.448 1.51 0.456 1.38
Edu99 0.003 0.14 0.002 0.11
GDPP 0.014 1.61 0.014 1.59
% of population -0.008 -0.41 -0.008 -0.41
North -0.290 -3.58 -0.294 -2.79
PCI06  -0.000 -0.05
# of obs† 1727 1727
F test (Prob) 18.98 17.62  
R squared 0.13 0.13  
Note:  † Number of observations. Large groups and private enterprises are 
excluded as reference groups 
 
Table 5 Correlation between PCI05 and region 
 Log(lp) PCI06 North 
Log(lp) 1.000   
PCI06 0.083 1.000  
North -0.066 -0.620 1.000 
Note: Figures in the Table are correlation coefficients 
Table 6 Reliability and coefficients of variables in the firm performance model 
General model Specific model – Dependent variable: log(labor productivity) 
 3: PCI06 4: Information 1 5: Information 2 
 Coeff Std-err Reliable  Coeff Std-err Reliable  Coeff Std-err Reliable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant 2.466*** 0.181 1.000 2.843*** 0.067 1.000 2.565*** 0.122 1.000 
K*L ratio 0.002*** 0.000 1.000 0.002*** 0.000 1.000 0.002*** 0.000 1.000 
Firm age 0.008** 0.004 1.000 0.008** 0.004 1.000 0.009** 0.004 1.000 
Micro -0.177** 0.080 1.000 -0.194** 0.079 1.000 -0.168** 0.079 0.700 
Small Exc†   Exc†   Exc†   
Medium Exc†   Exc†   Exc†   
Cooperative -0.602*** 0.130 1.000 -0.579*** 0.130 1.000 -0.615*** 0.130 1.000 
Limited 0.173** 0.063 1.000 0.222*** 0.062 1.000 0.202*** 0.061 1.000 
Shareholding  0.486*** 0.084 1.000 0.525*** 0.082 1.000 0.526*** 0.081 1.000 
Edus01 Exc†   Exc†   Exc†   
Edu99 0.017** 0.007 0.592 Exc†   Exc†   
GDPP 0.016*** 0.006 1.000 0.029*** 0.005 1.000 0.020*** 0.006 1.000 
% of population Exc†   Exc†   Exc†   
PCI05          
PCI06 0.007** 0.003 0.530       
Information 1    Exc†      
Information 2       0.053*** 0.017 0.499 
Land          
Dispute          
Transaction cost          
Labor training          
Number of obs 1727   1727   1727   
#  of outliers 52   51   52   
Chow (864:1) 0.9260   0.9029   0.8973   
Chow (1555:1) 0.6593   0.8827   0.6858   
Hetero test (Prob) 0.5948   0.8460   0.8852   
Note:   † Exc means the variable is not relevant and excluded from the model by the algorithm simulation. 
  ‘***’; ‘**’ are significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
General model Specific model – Dependent variable: log(labor productivity)       
 6: Land 7: Dispute 8:Transaction cost 9: Labor training 
 Coeff Std-err Reliable Coeff Std-err Reliable Coeff Std-err Reliable  Coeff Std-err Reliable  
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
Constant 2.191*** 0.329 1.000 2.843*** 0.067 1.000 2.843*** 0.067 1.000 2.635*** 0.127 1.000 
K*L ratio 0.002*** 0.000 1.000 0.002*** 0.000 1.000 0.002*** 0.000 1.000 0.002*** 0.000 1.000 
Firm age 0.008** 0.004 1.000 0.008** 0.004 1.000 0.008** 0.004 1.000 0.009** 0.004 1.000 
Micro -0.209*** 0.079 1.000 -0.194** 0.079 1.000 -0.194** 0.079 1.000 -0.185** 0.080 1.000 
Small Exc†   Exc†   Exc†   Exc†   
Medium Exc†   Exc†   Exc†   Exc†   
Cooperative -0.581*** 0.131 1.000 -0.579*** 0.130 1.000 -0.579*** 0.130 1.000 -0.586*** 0.130 1.000 
Limited 0.202** 0.064 1.000 0.222*** 0.062 1.000 0.222*** 0.062 1.000 0.212*** 0.062 1.000 
Shareholding  0.504*** 0.084 1.000 0.525*** 0.082 1.000 0.525*** 0.082 1.000 0.519*** 0.082 1.000 
Edus01 Exc†   Exc†   Exc†   Exc†   
Edu99 0.027*** 0.010 0.700 Exc†   Exc†   Exc†   
GDPP 0.027*** 0.006 1.000 0.029*** 0.005 1.000 0.029*** 0.005 1.000 0.024*** 0.006 1.000 
% of population Exc†   Exc†      Exc†   
PCI05             
PCI06             
Information 1             
Information 2             
Land 0.102** 0.049 0.223          
Dispute    Exc†         
Transaction cost       Exc†      
Labor training          0.040** 0.019 0.471 
Number of obs 1727   1727   1727   1727   
# of outliers 52   51   51   51   
Chow (864:1) 0.9260   0.9029   0.9029   0.9266   
Chow (1555:1) 0.8860   0.8827   0.8827   0.8926   
Hetero test (Prob) 0.6263   0.8460   0.8460   0.7482   
Note:   † Exc means the variable is not relevant and excluded from the model by the algorithm simulation. 
  ‘***’; ‘**’ are significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
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